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There exists a need for sharing user health data, especially with institutes for
research purposes, in a secure fashion. This is especially true in the case of a sys-
tem that includes a third party storage service, such as cloud computing, which
limits the control of the data owner. The use of encryption for secure data storage
continues to evolve to meet the need for flexible and fine-grained access control.
This evolution has led to the development of Attribute Based Encryption (ABE).
The use of ABE to ensure the security and privacy of health data has been ex-
plored. This thesis presents an ABE based framework which allows for the secure
outsourcing of the more computationally intensive processes for data decryption
to the cloud servers. This reduces the time needed for decryption to occur at the
user end and reduces the amount of computational power needed by users to access
data.
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Secure storage of electronic health data by health institutions, such as hospitals,
is made challenging if it is to be made available to other parties while ensuring
unauthorized access to user data is prevented and the privacy of their patients
is protected. These institutions typically store this data on physical hardware in
a secure location on their premises and so are able to prevent unauthorized ac-
cess through the use of adequate network security infrastructure. They are also
able to prevent authorized users from gaining access beyond their levels of control
through the use of proper access control mechanisms which ensures accountabil-
ity. The deployment of more efficient and modern information technology, such as
cloud computing, extends the trust boundary of the Information Technology (IT)
infrastructure of institutions beyond their facilities while giving them multiple ad-
vantages such as a potentially unlimited amount of storage and computational
capabilities. However, this new infrastructure exposes data to both internal and
external threats as the institutions no longer have physical control of the infras-
tructure on which their data is stored as that is now in the partial control of the
Cloud Service Providers (CSP).
A health institution typically collects data of varying types which varies de-
pending on the medical condition of their patients, with the patient name and id
being the link between different data sets. This type of data is called an Electronic
Health Record (EHR) [38, 43] and typically contains a variety of information of
different levels of sensitivity in relation to patients. Multiple research institutes
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may require access to only specific portions of this data across the multiple sets
that are related to their area of specialization. This makes access control more
complex depending on the number of users involved and their required level of
access to data at a granular level. The health institution would want to be able
to protect the privacy of their data from the CSP, while being able to grant their
partners access to the appropriate portions of the database they have rights to
as specified in their research partnership agreement. The access structure of the
system becomes increasingly complex as multiple health institutions and research
partners are added, with different individuals having similar or slightly varying
levels of access across the platform.
One way of ensuring that user data is protected from both the CSPs and from
unauthorized users is to encrypt the data before it is stored in the cloud using
available encryption schemes. This grants only authorized users access to the
required information (usually a key) to gain access to data in its original form. This
system becomes a challenge when there is a need to provide fine-grained access to
data to third parties in order to ensure that the privacy of users is not violated
in relation to privacy laws such as the Personal Health Information Protection
Act (PHIPA) [10]. PHIPA governs the collection, use and disclosure of personal
information in the health sector in the province of Ontario, Canada. Sharing data
with third parties such as universities and research institutes becomes a challenge
as the health institutions need to ensure patient privacy is not violated. The
maintenance of patient privacy is especially important if data is to be shared for
the purposes of necessary research which could lead to advancements in the health
industry and improve the service delivery for patients while saving more lives.
The need to meet the privacy and security requirements have led to the creation
of systems for the sharing of electronic health data based on a system of encryp-
tion called Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) [21, 32, 2, 4, 3, 20, 19, 27]. ABE,
developed by Sahai and Waters [35], provides the opportunity for fine-grained ac-
cess control to data. ABE achieves this be having an attribute based access policy
attached to either the secret key of the user or the encrypted ciphertext. This
depends on the variant of ABE because if the access policy is contained in the ci-
phertext then the corresponding attributes will have to be in the secret key and vice
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versa. This means that, if there is no match between the attributes of a user’s key
and the ciphertext, decryption is prevented. This enables the health institutions
to be able to grant third parties access to only the specific data that they require
to carry out their research while ensuring that Personal Identifiable Information
(PII) of patients is not exposed in line with privacy laws and requirements.
1.2 Research Challenge
To allow for the kind of access required as described in the previous section, there
is a need to develop a system that enables the secure exchange of Electronic Health
Records. These systems would need to take advantage of existing advancements in
the field of information technology, such as cloud computing, which gives individu-
als access to potentially unlimited amounts of storage and processing capabilities.
These advancements further extend the trust boundaries of systems that use them
as the physical devices that make up the infrastructure are not under the control of
users. This makes the storage services that they provide potentially untrustworthy
for use with highly sensitive data such as Electronic Health Records (EHRs). We
also want to take advantage of the computational capabilities of these services for
any operations that are potentially computationally intensive with regards to our
data while maintaining the same levels of security and preserving the privacy of
the information they contain.
To find a solution to this challenge we need to use effective cryptographic
schemes that preserve privacy and provide the levels of security that we require.
Security can easily be provided by existing cryptographic schemes but they are
limited in their ability to provide fine grained access control and preserve privacy
of information at a granular level. Using latest developments in the area of cryp-
tographic research, specifically Attribute Based Encryption (ABE), takes us a step
closer to finding a solution to the aforementioned challenge. The use of existing
techniques is also needed to modify an effective ABE scheme to be part of a de-
veloped framework so that we are able to take advantage of the computational
abilities of the third party service with regards to the operations that are compu-
tationally intensive. This is with regards to most of the decryption operations of
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ABE schemes.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
In this thesis we have developed a framework for the sharing of electronic health
data among multiple parties. Our framework ensures security and preserves privacy
while allowing for the use of potentially untrusted third party services. The frame-
work is based on a proposed Multi-Authority Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based
Encryption with Outsourcing (MACP-ABEwO) scheme with securely outsourced
decryption that is based on the ABE scheme in developed by Kan Yang and Xiao-
hua Jia [44]. Our proposed MACP-ABEwO scheme provides effective decryption
outsourcing in a multi-authority setting.
The platform employs symmetric encryption for the security of the actual data
sets. The MACP-ABEwO scheme is applied to encrypt the secret keys that users
need to gain access to data in its plain form. The use of symmetric encryption for
the actual data is as a result of the high amount of computation required for en-
cryption and decryption algorithms of the different available public key encryption
schemes, a category that includes the MACP-ABEwO scheme. The security of this
protocol had been proven thoroughly in the original work [44] and as a result, we
have limited our analysis to the basic security requirements that are to be met by
the framework.
The major contribution of this thesis is a framework for the exchange of elec-
tronic health data with significant decrease in the computational requirements in
terms of time and resources. This decrease is as a result of the outsourcing of the
more computationally intensive operation typically involved in the ABE decryp-
tion process to the cloud. This enables the secure exchange of sensitive health data
among health institutions and other third parties, such as research partners.
This framework architecture could be used to design a system for the exchange
of other types of sensitive data of a complex nature that requires a fine grained
level of access control.
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1.4 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides some background technical
information on related subjects such as security and privacy, electronic health data,
cloud computing, cryptography, and Attribute Based Encryption (ABE). It also
provides a review of literature outlining work done in the area of ABE to improve
the security and performance original schemes while adding features such as revo-
cation. A review of systems that have been built based on ABE for the handling
of health related data is also included. Chapter 3 introduces our secure privacy
preserving framework for electronic health records. It provides the description and
mathematical construction for the underlying ABE scheme and also a description
of the architecture of our framework together with use cases. Chapter 4 provides
details of the evaluation of our framework and also the results. It describes our
experimental setup, provides a detailed performance evaluation with relation to
computation and also provides a security analysis of the framework. Chapter 5
concludes the thesis, highlighting our contribution and also providing information
on possible areas for future improvements.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
2.1 Security and Privacy
This section provides a description of the concepts of security and privacy, two
key features of the framework described in this thesis. They are both important
features of any system that involves the flow of data among multiple parties or
entities.
2.1.1 Security
Security according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[23] is defined as any condition that leads to the creation and maintenance of defen-
sive measures to ensure than an information technology infrastructure continues to
perform it basic or critical functions irrespective of the risks posed by the threats
to its normal operation.
The major considerations when analyzing the security of any system are con-
fidentiality, integrity and availability. These objectives are an essential condition
for any system to be considered secure.
Confidentiality [23] assures that only those entities in the system that are au-
thorized have access to data that is either being stored, processed or transferred in
the system.
Integrity [23] relates to the verification of the authenticity of data. This means
ensuring that data has not been manipulated in any form either while in transit or
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while in storage. This ensures that any unauthorized manipulation of data in the
form of addition, deletion or substitution is detected.
Availability [23] is a measure of the level of accessibility and usability of a
particular system upon request by an authorized user. This means that the system
should be able to at all times carry out the various functions in order to meet the
demands of its users. This also covers the ability of the infrastructure to remain
functional even when some individual makes attempts to compromise its integrity.
Cryptography
Cryptography [23] is the field of study which represents the principles, means and
methods used for transforming data in order to hide their original content and
prevent unauthorized use or modification. This typically involves the study of
several mathematical techniques. Cryptography can be broadly divided into secret
key and public key cryptography also known as symmetric and asymmetric schemes.
(1) Secret Key Cryptography (Symmetric) - This type of cryptographic system
involve the use of a single secret key which is usually agreed upon by both
parties who want to keep their communication secret. This secret key is used
to encrypt the original message typically described as the plaintext (i.e encode
the plaintext into a ciphertext that cannot be read by a party without the
secret key). The receiving party if authorized and in possession of the secret
key is able to decrypt the ciphertext and gain access to the original message.
Examples of secret key schemes include the Ciphers (Caesar, Monoalpha-
betic and Polyalphabetic cyphers), Data Encryption Standard (DES), and
Advanced Encryption Standard.
(2) Public Key Cryptography (Asymmetric) - This type of cryptographic systems
was developed as a result of the challenges in secret key cryptography which
include the problem of key management and lack of secure channel for users
to exchange keys. Public key cryptography involves the use of two separate
keys, a public and private key, which are used to perform complementary
operations such as encryption and decryption or signature generation and
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verification. Examples of public key schemes include the Diffie–Hellman key
exchange protocol, RSA, Elgamal and Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
Cryptographic Adversary Models
Attacks on cryptographic systems aimed at recovering the plaintext from the ci-
phertext or the secret key can be classified into four broad categories.
(1) Ciphertext Only Attack [31] - A ciphertext only attack is a class of attacks in
which the adversary only has access to some ciphertext without any knowl-
edge of the corresponding plaintext. This is the weakest type of attack be-
cause the adversary has the least amount of information to work with and
any encryption scheme vulnerable to this class of attack is considered to be
completely insecure.
(2) Known Plaintext Attack [31] - A known plaintext attack is a class of attacks
in which the adversary has access to some plaintext and ciphertext pairs. The
adversary is unable to create more pairs and in only able to gain access to
these by eavesdropping on the comunication channel between parties. These
types of attacks are only marginally more difficult to mount.
(3) Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) [31] - A chosen plaintext attack is a class
of attacks where the adversary is able to select the plaintext and request
for the corresponding ciphertexts. This is typically done through the use of
a black box system, typically called an oracle, that is able to produce the
corresponding ciphertext when given any plaintext without revealing the key
or any information about the plaintext of the original ciphertext that the
adversary is trying to decrypt. A variation of this is the adaptive chosen
plaintext attack where the adversary chooses the new plaintext based on the
ciphertext received for earlier submitted plaintexts.
(4) Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA) [31] - A chosen ciphertext attack is a class
of attacks where the adversary selects any ciphertext and requests for the
corresponding plaintext. This is the direct opposite of the chosen plaintext
attack class. This class of attacks are considered to be the strongest model of
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attacks when classifying encryption schemes based on their level of resistance.
An adaptive chosen ciphertext attack just like the adaptive version of CPA,
involves the adversary deciding on what ciphertext to submit based on the
plaintext received for earlier requests.
Note that some of the attack types described above are mutually exclusive (for
instance, an attack cannot be both chosen plaintext and known plaintext). And
also the chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks are somewhat exclusive to the modern
era of cryptography.
2.1.2 Privacy
Privacy is commonly equated with the concept of confidentiality although they are
both distinct. While confidentiality is mainly concerned with ensuring that only
users who are authorized have access to data which is being stored, processed or
transferred within a system. Privacy, on the other hand, is concerned with ensur-
ing that users have more control over the collection, use and storage of information
that is related to them. Therefore, while maintaining the confidentiality of a sys-
tem aids in preserving privacy, confidentiality does not completely ensure privacy
as an authorized user may abuse that privilege by violating the privacy of user
information [33].
The range of what is considered private information significantly varies in scope
depending on the application area. For instance, in the health sector, private
information can be regarded as any oral or written information that meets any of
the following criteria: relates to the health of the individual, including their family
history; relates to health care provision, including the source of care; constitutes
as service for individuals who require long term care; relates to payment for health
care. More importantly, private information is any information that can be used
to identify an individual, either alone or when related to another piece of available
information [11].
The Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) [10] is an act that
establishes the guidelines for the collection, use, and disclosure of personal health
information in the Ontario province of Canada. The guidelines are to be followed
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by individual and organizations that work with health information, both the custo-
dians and those who receive information from the custodians. The guidelines also
protects the right to privacy of individuals with respect to their Personal Health
Information (PHI) by giving them the authority to have access and request modifi-
cations to their PHIs. It also requires that individuals provide consent before their
PHI can be collected, user or disclosed.
The privacy of data that is stored in the cloud faces multiple challenges as a
result of the different ways in which the data are stored or processed on a machine
that is usually owned by a different organization, the CSP. The major issues that
exist in this area of privacy relate to trust as users are not completely certain
that: their data is not being used for other purposes other than that for which it
was collected; that data is destroyed properly in the end; privacy breaches have
occurred which may have exposed their information; their information is retained
even after they have stopped using a particular service [33].
2.2 Electronic Health Data
There are three broad classes in relation to the electronic collection and storage
of health information according to Canada Health Infoway [38]. These classes
have been established in order to accelerate the adoption and use of digital health
solutions across Canada, and can be defined as:
• Electronic Health Record (EHR) [38] - these records usually contain infor-
mation about an individual’s health and their health care history. Typical
information contained in these records include lab results, medication pro-
files, clinical reports, and diagnostic images. The EHR is made available
electronically to authorized health care institutions
• Electronic Medical Record (EMR) [38] - this refers to the digital form of
the information acquired during an individual’s visit to a health institution.
This allows the doctor at the facility to gain access to information about the
individual, including potential information stored in the EHR.
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• Personal Health Record (PHR) [38] - this is simply a compete or partial
record containing information about an individual’s health and usually in
their custody. The health care institution has no control of this and it is
managed by the individual.
The focus of this work is on EHRs which are typically shared among multiple
parties and under the control of the medical institution. EHRs as earlier stated
provide a comprehensive record of the health information of patients. They are
used to share this information with other health care provides and organizations
[43, 42]. They also contain the patient administrative and billing data and patient
demographics. This is together with other health related information such as vital
signs, test results, etc. that they contain. The sensitive nature of the information
contained in the EHR makes it important they are stored and shared in a manner
that ensures security and privacy.
2.3 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing [30], is “a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network ac-
cess to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers,
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released
with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” Cloud comput-
ing offers considerable advantages to both government and private organizations,
which has led to its growth and world wide acceptance in recent years. Some of the
advantages offered by the cloud include: easy and fast deployment of IT systems;
reduction in the cost of installation and maintenance of infrastructure; easy accessi-
bility; improved flexibility of systems; and a heavy reduction in the responsibilities
of the user as most of the traditional tasks will be handled by the provider of the
cloud based service, the Cloud Service Provider (CSP).
The different service models for cloud computing are Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS). These
delivery models are distinct based on what services the CSP provides and the
amount of responsibility that falls on the user in terms of control and management
of resources. The IaaS model gives users more responsibilities as they have control
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over their operating systems, storage and applications which have been deployed
while the SaaS offers the least amount of responsibilities which are limited to some
application configuration settings. More detailed information about the different
service models can be found in the NIST Definition for Cloud Computing [30].
The deployment models available in cloud computing are the private, commu-
nity, public and hybrid cloud models. These models are based on the number
of parties that share the available deployed infrastructure. The private cloud is
typically setup for use for a single organization while the community and public
cloud models usually involve multiple parties with the former involving parties that
share similar interest and requirements, while the latter is typically provisioned and
available for use by the general public. The hybrid cloud model is basically a combi-
nation of the any of the other models and is typically a combination of the private
and public models with the aim of benefiting from the strengths of the models
while eliminating individual model weaknesses. More detailed information about
the different deployment models can be found in the NIST Definition for Cloud
Computing [30].
The cloud computing deployment model this thesis considers is the public cloud
model as this is the model mostly used or a hybrid model potentially involving a
private and public cloud model focusing on the vulnerabilities of the public facing
infrastructure. Also, users of the private model have more control over their infras-
tructure and are able, to a certain degree, to ensure that the security and privacy
of stored data is assured.
Cloud Computing Security Challenges
The use of cloud computing provides numerous advantages in terms of the ability to
provide significant computational and storage resources. These resources are made
available in an easy to use manner by providing simplified system setup, operation
and maintenance with the added benefit of reduced costs. The unique properties
of this environment leads to a different set of security and privacy challenges in
addition to the traditional challenges. This is because of the way it is setup. That
is, the physical infrastructure is in the control of the CSP and typically shared
among their various customers through the use of visualization.
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Cloud security challenges include [34]:
• Privacy and User Data Confidentiality - User have limited control as the do
not have physical control of the infrastructure on which their data is stored.
Also users are not able to prevent critical information from being accessed
and used by the providers without the deployment of adequate security mech-
anisms.
• Multi-Tenancy Issue - This is an issue unique to the cloud computing setup.
This is because providers typically have the data and services of multiple
users on the same physical infrastructure. This could allow other clients of
the CSP to potentially gain illegal access to the data of other users on the
same infrastructure.
• Increased Exposure to External Threats - User data is exposed to more ex-
ternal threats through the use of cloud services and results in an increased
probability of attacks. This is because adversaries are more likely to attack
CSPs in order to gain access to the information of numerous users.
These challenges are even more critical when users who work with highly sen-
sitive data, such as health data, are considering the use of cloud services.
2.4 Technical Preliminaries
This section provides a detailed description of concepts that form the foundation of
Attribute Based-Encryption (ABE). ABE is a pairing based form of cryptography
that is a fundamental building block of the framework described in this thesis. This
includes the different mathematical tools, foundational concepts and a description
of the complexity assumptions.
2.4.1 Bilinear Maps
The concept of bilinear maps, or pairings, are the foundation of pairing based
cryptography which allowed of the creating of cryptosystems with a great variety
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of functionalities. Cyclic groups with efficiently computable bilinear maps form the
basis of bilinear maps.
There are two general types of bilinear maps, namely:
1. Symmetric Pairing [29] - In this type of pairing we have two cyclic groups
G,GT of prime order p with g as the a generator of G. The efficiently com-
putable bilinear map in this case is represented as
e : G×G = GT
2. Assymmetric Pairing [29] - In this type of pairing we have three cyclic
groups G1, G2, GT with G1 and GT of order p and G2 a group with each
element having an order dividing pG. The efficiently computable bilinear
map in this case is represented as
e : G1 ×G2 = GT
The type of pairing used in this work is symmetric. Below is a definition of
bilinear maps as well as the properties that make it efficient for use in Attribute
Based Encryption.
Definition 2.4.1. (Bilinear Maps [29]) Let G,GT be two cyclic groups (multi-
plicative or additive) of prime order p. Let g be a generator for G and e : G×G =
GT . The bilinear map e has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: for all u, v ∈ Ganda, b ∈ Zp, we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1
2.4.2 Access Structures
The definitions of access structures and linear secret sharing schemes used in this
thesis have been adapted from [5].
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Definition 2.4.2. (Access Structures [5]) Let {P1, . . . , Pn} be a set of parties.
A collection A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn} is monotone if ∀B,C : if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C, then C
∈ A. An access structure, i.e monotone is a collection A of non-empty subsets of
{P1, . . . , Pn} i.e., A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn} \ {}. The sets in A are called the authorized sets,
and the sets not in A are called the unauthorized sets.
In ABE, attributes play the role of parties in the access structure and the
scheme in this thesis only considers access structures that are monotone.
Access policies based on monotone access structures could be represented as
either a Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) Matrix or with the use of monotonic
boolean formulas which could be represented as an access tree in which the core
nodes are used to represent the AND and OR gates with the attributes represented
by the leaf nodes.
Access policies based on monotone access structures could be represented in
two different ways for ABE schemes. The two widely used methods are:
2.4.3 Secret Sharing Schemes
Secret sharing schemes which was first created by Shamir in [36] allows for the
division of data among multiple parties in such a way that the original data can
only be reconstructed if a party is in possession of at least a fixed number of
division, usually the threshold, and possession of a number of pieces less than the
threshold reveals no information about the original data. Other earlier works in
secret sharing include works by Barkley [8], Benaloh [6] and Ito, Saito and Nishizeki
[22]. LSSS are secret sharing schemes in which the reconstruction of the original
secret is done using a linear function of the available pieces [5].
Definition 2.4.3. (Linear Secret Sharing Schemes [5, 41]) A secret sharing
scheme
∏
over a set of parties P is called linear (over Zp) if
1. The shared for each party form a vector over Zp.
2. There exists a matrixM with ` rows and n columns called the share-generating
matrix for
∏
. For all i = 1, . . . , `, with Mi representing the i’th row of M .
The function ρ is defined as the party labelling row i as ρ(i). Consider a
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column vector ~v = (s, r2, . . . , rn) where s ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared and
r2, . . . , rn ∈ Zp are chosen randomly, then Mv can be described as the vector
` shares of the secret s according to
∏
. The share (Mv)i belongs to party
ρ(i).
The linear reconstruction property as described in [5] shows that suppose that∏
is an LSSS for an access structure A. Let S ∈ A be any authorized set, and let
I ⊂ 1, . . . , ` be defined as I = i : ρ(i) ∈ S. Then there exits constants wi ∈ Zpi∈I




i∈I wiλi = s.
Note that access structures represented as boolean formulas, which are typically
represented by binary trees, can be converted into a LSSS form using the techniques
described in [39] with the number of rows in the corresponding matrix equal to the
number of leaf nodes in the access tree.
2.4.4 Cryptographic Complexity Assumptions
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p. Let g be a generator for G represented
as G = 〈g〉 and let x, y, z ∈ G . The different complexity assumptions used to
show the security of the different pairing based schemes have their foundation in
the following core hardness problems [29]:
• Discrete Log (DLog) Problem - Given g and gx, compute x.
• Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem - Given g, gx, and gy,
compute gxy.
• Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem - Given g, gx, gy and gz ,
determine if xy = z.
2.5 Attribute Based Encryption (ABE)
ABE is a pairing based cryptogaphic scheme that was developed based on Identity
Based Encryption (IBE) which was originally proposed by Shamir in 1984 [37].
Shamir proposed a scheme which allowed for the encryption and decryption of in-
formation between two different users without the need for any exchange of keys
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between both parties. His proposal assumed the existence of a trusted key gen-
eration service similar to Certificate Authorities (CA) which were responsible for
registration of users as they join a network and also for subsequent verification of
their identity. Personal information unique to several users, such as their address,
email address or a combination of this information, was used as the public key in
the system. This allowed for the encryption of data meant for UserB by UserA
using the email address of UserB, e.g “userB@gmail.com”. UserB on receiving this
encrypted data would then contact the key generation service and, after success-
ful authentication, receives a secret key granting him access to the original data.
The scheme proposed by Shamir was further developed and the first practical and
secure IBE scheme was presented by Boneh and Franklin in [9], who developed a
fully functional IBE scheme which made use of groups for which there existed an
efficiently computable bilinear map such as the Weil pairing.
Sahai and Waters in [35] developed a new scheme that improved on the existing
IBE schemes by creating a system in which the user identity is viewed as a set of
descriptive attributes, allowing a user to encrypt data for all users who have a
certain set of attributes. Decryption in this case is only permitted if the identity of
a user, and the identity for which the ciphertext was encrypted, were close enough
based on their individual attributes. It is in this work that the notion of Attribute
Based Encryption is first mentioned.
Goyal et al. in [17] developed an ABE scheme that was more robust than the
original ABE scheme proposed by Sahai and Waters [35]. In their scheme, termed
Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE), each ciphertext created by the
user contains a set of descriptive attributes. Secret keys of individual users are
associated with an access structure which specifies the attributes that need to be
contained in a ciphertext for successful decryption. The access tree structure could
be made up of interior nodes that consist of AND and OR gates with the leaves
containing different attributes. For example, if UserA’s key in KP-ABE contains
“C AND D” as the access policy, the only ciphertexts he should be able to decrypt
are those that contains both attributes C and D. A ciphertext with only attribute
C or D could not be decrypted by UserA as the requirements for access would not
be satisfied. The keys generated for users in this scheme are also collusion resistant
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just like the original scheme, meaning that no two users with different attributes
could combine their keys to create an overlap of attributes that would give them
the ability to decrypt files which they would not normally be able to decrypt.
The authors in [17] mentioned a variant to the KP-ABE scheme known as
the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) scheme which they
left as an open problem that was solved by [7]. In CP-ABE, the ciphertexts are
associated with the access policy while the user keys contain a set of descriptive
attributes. This would mean that, for a key to decrypt a particular ciphertext, its
attributes need to match the access structure of the access policy of the ciphertext.
This scheme, unlike the KP-ABE scheme, gives the user encrypting data more
control as the user is able to control who can have access to data being encrypted
by making sure the access policy in the ciphertext specifies what attributes need
to be possessed for access to be granted.
The four basic algorithms of any ABE based system includes the following:
1. Setup - The setup algorithm is responsible for the selection of the bilinear
group and the definition of a bilinear map that has the properties of bilin-
earity, computability and non-degeneracy. The setup algorithm takes as its
input the security parameter which specifies the size of the attribute set and
generates a public key (PK) and a master key (MK) as output.
2. Keygen - The keygen algorithm takes as its input two parameters, the MK
generated during setup and the set of attributes that the user possesses, and
generates a secret key (SK) for the user in CP-ABE. The input for KP-ABE
includes the MK, PK and an access structure and outputs SK.
3. Encryption - The encryption algorithm takes as its input PK, a message M,
and an access structure for CP-ABE schemes and produces a ciphertext C.
It takes as input PK, M and a set of attributes and produces a ciphertext C
for KP-ABE schemes.
4. Decryption - The decryption algorithm takes as input PK, C and SK and,
if the attributes of either the ciphertext or secret key satisfies the access
structure of the other, depending on whether the scheme is a CP-ABE or
KP-ABE scheme, decrypts C and outputs M.
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Both variants of ABE allows for delegation. This would allow a user with a
secret key, for set of attributes (CP-ABE) or containing an access structure (KP-
ABE), to derive a new secret key. The derived key would contain a set of attributes
that is a subset of the attribute set of the original key or an access structure that
is more restrictive than the access structure contained in the original key.
2.6 Revocation
A useful feature with ABE based systems is the ability for user revocation. This is
a challenge as multiple users may share a similar attribute which could cause the
revocation of one user to affect other users who share a similar attribute. Further-
more it is important that user revocation be flexible and occur at different granular
levels which means that revocation could involve removal of a user completely or a
partial reduction of a user’s access, based on their attributes. The addition of an
expiry date to the generated key has been proposed by initial ABE based systems
[7] but does not offer an effective means for the revocation of user attributes.
Yu et al. in [46] proposed a scheme that enables secure, scalable and fine grained
data access to a cloud based system with a great reduction in the computation
overhead by delegating most of the computation intensive tasks to the cloud servers
while ensuring the security and privacy of user data through the combination of KP-
ABE, proxy re-encryption (PRE) and lazy re-encryption (LRE). In their scheme,
the attributes that are assigned to the ciphertexts are all assigned a unique ID
which serves as the version number that is stored in a list maintained by the cloud
servers, together with the PRE keys used. The cloud servers also maintain a list
of all the existing users in the system who are currently authorized to have access
to the different stored data. Data files are encrypted using symmetric encryption
with the decryption keys encrypted using ABE and appended to the encrypted
data file together with a unique file ID. PRE enables the use of a proxy to convert
a ciphertext which has been encrypted using the public key of a particular user into
another ciphertext that can be decrypted using the private key of a different user,
without revealing the contents of the underlying file. In order to revoke a user,
the scheme determines the least amount of attributes that need to be updated to
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prevent a user from having access and redefines the public and master keys for
those attributes while generating the corresponding PRE keys. The revoked user’s
ID, the attribute set, the PRE keys and the new public key parameters are sent to
the cloud servers. The cloud servers then remove the revoked user from the user
list, store the new public key parameters and then updates its list of attributes
together with the PRE keys used.
Yu et al. in [40] have applied the concept of proxy re-encryption with CP-ABE
in order to enable revocation. Liang et al. in [28] have proposed the system Ci-
phertext Policy Attribute Encryption with Revocation (CP-ABE-R), which makes
use of linear secret sharing and binary tree techniques to enable effective revocation
of users with the aid of a unique identifier assigned to each user in the system and
which is not needed for encryption and decryption. Cheng et al. have proposed a
scheme [14] that enables effective revocation in CP-ABE by dividing the original
data into multiple parts which they term slices, before they are stored in the cloud
which allows for revocation by the re-encryption of only one slice. The data is
encrypted with a symmetric key and then split into multiple parts using a secret
sharing scheme. In the case of the secret sharing scheme applied here, the number
of parts that are needed to reconstruct the original file is equal to the number of
distinct parts. A particular slice of data is chosen as the dynamic data and it is
this slice that is constantly re-encrypted to enable revocation while the static data
remains the same. This reduces the computational and storage overhead while
ensuring that the security of the system is not compromised.
2.7 Multi-Authority Schemes
The first Multi-Authority Attribute Based Encryption (MA-ABE) scheme was pro-
posed by Chase in [12, 15] and was based on Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption
(KP-ABE). In this scheme, there are multiple Attribute Authorities (AA) in addi-
tion to a Central Authority (CA) which are responsible for generating secret keys
corresponding to the attributes which they handle. Users are assigned a Global
Unique Identifier (GUID) which they use to request the shares of the system-wide
Master Secret Key (MSK) handled by the different authorities. The GUID is used
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by the authorities to tie the shares to a particular user. The system includes a CA
which is responsible for aiding users in decryption by ensuring that all the shares
generated for a particular user by the different AAs sum up to the same MSK. The
CA ensures this by assigning to each user a special value that cancels out all of
the shares from the different authorities, providing the user with a function of the
system wide MSK. In order to carry out its functions, the CA has knowledge of the
MSK and as a result would also be able to decrypt any ciphertext in the system
which is in contrast with the idea behind using multiple authorities, which is to
distribute trust among several untrusted authorities. Also, in the original system,
the users use their GUIDs to identify with the individual AAs, which means that
several authorities could combine their information about a particular user and
develop a profile based on the attributes that the user has acquired and be able to
generate keys with the same level of access as the user.
Chase and Chow in [13] proposed a solution to the original MA-ABE problem
which eliminated the use of a CA and also prevented the AAs from having the
ability to combine the information about a user by allowing users to use pseudonyms
for interacting with the individual AAs in the system instead of the use of their
respective GUID. This solution eliminates the CA by applying a set of Pseudo
Random Functions (PRF), and having every pair of authorities in the system share
a secret PRF seed which allows for a combination of all their individually generated
shares. To enable users to communicate with the individual AAs using pseudonyms,
the authors have developed a novel Anonymous Key Issuing Protocol. Additional
details about the protocol and its functions can be found in [15, 13].
Lewko and Waters proposed a MA-ABE [24, 39] solution in which the different
authorities operate independently and do not have to share any common infor-
mation with each other as in [12] except for an initial set of common reference
parameters. Their system has higher tolerance as the failure or corruption of au-
thorities in the system will not have a direct impact on the operation of the fully
functioning and uncorrupted authorities. Furthermore, in their solution, any party
could become an authority by making available, to the other entities in the system,
their verification key and their lift of managed attributes. This solution makes use
of Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS) access structures and the authors show
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that boolean formulas could easily be transformed into LSSS structures using tech-
niques found in [39]. Lewko and Waters have used the dual system proof technique
to prove the security of their system.
Yang et al. in [45] have developed a solution called DAC-MACS (Data Access
Control for Multi-Authority Cloud Storage) in order to make a more efficient CP-
ABE based MA-ABE solution that takes advantage of the services available in the
area of cloud computing and that is more suited to this domain. Their solution
includes an efficient attribute revocation method that enables both forward and
backward security. In addition to providing a means for attribute revocation, Yang
et al.’s system [45] has better efficiency than other similar solutions. Also, by using
a decryption token for the decryption, they have been able to transfer the intensive
computations over to the cloud server, thereby reducing the computational over-
head on the side of the end user. A flaw in the system is the fact that the different
AAs have knowledge of the GUID of the users which would give a revoked user the
ability to derive the key update key that they could use to update their own keys
by corrupting any AA, together with some non-revoked users.
Yang and Jia [44] have developed a more effective MA-ABE solution based on
CP-ABE. In their new system, the secret keys of the different users are not related
to the key of the data owner and so users will only need to hold an individual secret
key for an authority instead of multiple secret keys associated with multiple owners.
This makes it more suitable for a multi-owner setting as storage overhead for user
keys is greatly reduced. They have also improved the revocation mechanism by
modifying it to require that only ciphertexts associated with a revoked attribute
be updated and by using a single update key for the update of both keys and
ciphertexts.
The scheme by Yang and Jia [44] will be modified for the development of the
proposed scheme as part of the framework in this work and be used in comparison
to show the performance of the proposed scheme. This is because their scheme is
more efficient in comparison with other existing multi-authority schemes.
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2.8 Outsourcing
An important extension to the functionality of available ABE schemes is the ability
to outsource the computationally intensive operations such as the decryption of the
ciphertext to third party systems such as a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) while
maintaining the same levels of security and privacy as the existing ABE schemes.
This enables users to have access to the required data using devices with low
computational power such as mobile devices with no additional risk.
This was initially proposed by Green et al. in [18]. In their approach, they
achieve outsourcing by splitting the traditional decryption algorithm into two com-
ponents. The first a transformation algorithm to be run externally by the CSP,
which given the necessary input transforms the ABE ciphertext into a constant-size
El Gamal-style ciphertext. The second component is the decryption algorithm to
be executed by the user which with the El Gamal-style ciphertext and the right
input produces the original message. The second component to be run by the
user is less computationally intensive as it involves a single exponentiation oper-
ation compared to the multiple pairing operation involved in the transformation
algorithm. They have applied this to single authority KP- and CP-ABE schemes
showing improvements with relation to size of the ciphertext at the user end and
minimal impact on the bandwidth of the decryption process. Their approach has
the added benefit of reducing the amount of code that has to reside on the user
device and the main bulk of code which corresponding to the analysis of ABE
attributes and the computation of pairings now resides on the third party device
allowing for a smaller and more trusted code base on the user end.
Other authors [25, 26] have extended the idea of outsourcing in ABE by out-
sourcing the key generation algorithm in addition to the decryption algorithm
through several other methods with limited improvements on the level of overhead
achieved by Green et al. in [18].
Sherman Chow has created a framework in [16] that allows for the construction
of an ABE scheme with multiple authorities, revocation capability and outsourcing
of the decryption algorithm from a single authority ABE scheme if certain condi-
tions are met. These include the ability to split the ciphertext and secret keys into
both attribute-dependent and attribute-independent components. The framework
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also requires that the structure of secret keys generated by multiple attribute au-
thorities share a structure that makes them indistinguishable from keys generated
by a single authority.
2.9 ABE Based Health Care Systems
Ibraimi et al. proposed a new variant of CP-ABE [21] in order to be able to enforce
the required levels of access controls in a multiple domain based system to ensure
the security of personal health records (PHR). They have distributed the group
of users who normally require access to PHRs into two domains: the professional
domain, which consists of the health care providers; and the social domain, made
up of family members, friends and possibly fellow patients. Their proposed variant
of CP-ABE allows the encryption of health records with an access policy that
is made up of attributes issued by two different trusted authorities: the trusted
authority in charge of the professional domain and the trusted authority in charge
of the social domain.
The authors in [32] have proposed the design of a patient controlled cloud
based EHR infrastructure using CP-ABE. They have based their system on the
assumptions: a trusted authority (TA) exists that is responsible for the generation
of keys for users and is able to store the public parameters and public keys of
users in a public directory; each user is associated with a unique identifier and
a set of attributes; and the cloud server used for storage is only trusted for the
performance of storage operations. They have used a variant of CP-ABE, known as
broadcast ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (bABE), which extends the
traditional CP-ABE to enable revocation of users’ keys. They have also provided
the functionality of keyword search which allows users to search using a search term
by providing a key which allows the cloud provider to perform search operations
on the encrypted data without learning anything about the actual data contents.
Akinyele in [2], using ABE, has provided a detailed design and implementation
of self-protecting EMR which allows EMR availability even when the providers
are offline. Their system makes role- and content-based access control possible.
For role-based access control, users are granted explicit access to collections of
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data related to their roles that match some specific criteria which the authors
have termed content slices. These slices could be as specific as required by the
system administrators and the content-based access is used to grant access to users
such as contractors, who have no definite roles in the system but require access to
records to carry out their functions. They have also implemented a policy engine
as part of their design to evaluate new or updated EMRs in order to determine
the policies that are to be used for encryption. The policy engine’s final decision
is based on either the set of policies specified by the administrator, the identity
and nature of the EHR, the annotations attached to the EHR, or in some cases the
textual content of the record. They have taken advantage of the XML-based EMR
standards which include the Continue of Care Record (CCR) and the Continuity
of Care Document (CCD) which allows their policy encryption engine to parse
each node in order to determine the appropriate access policy and subsequently
the access control rule and content related attributes for which the document is to
be encrypted. Users will need to be present at the initialization stage to have their
mobile devices provisioned with the required decryption keys to be able to use the
accompanying mobile application to access their data. CP-ABE is used to grant
access to patients and health professionals using keys with fixed attributes related
to their roles or responsibilities while users with no definite role are granted access
through the use of KP-ABE by generating keys, which contain a specific policy
that defines what data they can access and, in some cases, the time periods for
which they can have access.
Barua et al. in [4] have proposed a scheme which they called Efficient and
Secure Patient-centric Access Control (ESPAC), in which they have used CP-ABE
to achieve patient-centric access control allowing different access privileges based
on the roles of the data requester and assigning the corresponding attributes based
on those privileges. They have constructed their access control policy by assign-
ing attributes, based on the relationship between the patient and the requesting
party, which is used to determine the privacy levels of the requesting party before
attributes are assigned. Their system is made up of four main entities: the trusted
authority (TA), the cloud service provider (CSP), the registered user, and the
data-access requester. The scheme makes use of pseudo identity instead of unique
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identities to ensure privacy. The scheme enables message integrity checks, non-
repudiation and source authentication through the use of signature verification.
This scheme is able to ensure forward and backward secrecy.
Suhair et al. in [3] have proposed the design of a cloud based EHR system using
CP-ABE to ensure security by using the credentials and attributes of the health
care providers as the universal attribute set. Their proposed architecture is made
up mainly of three components: the EHR system hosted on the cloud; the partici-
pating healthcare providers; and the attribute authority (AA) which is in control of
generating the secret keys of users which contain the appropriate attributes. The
cloud is used for data storage and computation in their infrastructure. Encryption
and decryption of the medical records are performed at the client end through the
use of lightweight software. Suhair et al. have proposed the addition of an ex-
piry date to the access policies used for encryption, or complete re-encryption with
updated access policies, as a way to achieve revocation in order to avoid the com-
munication overhead involved with the re-distribution of secret keys to authorized
users. The use of a single AA presents a focal point of weakness for the security of
the system and presents the key escrow problem.
Hupperich et al. in [20] propose an architecture that gives the patient control of
the delegation of access to their EHRs, in line with the existing privacy laws. They
have proposed a system that would allow patients to authorize the appropriate
health care service providers to have access to their EHRs through a flexible channel
that would not require the patient to be present. In order to eliminate the use
of smart cards for access, and to enable health care providers to have access to
EHRs their infrastructure only requires the use of the patient’s smart card at the
initial stage for the generation of a transaction code (TAC) which the patient
can use to grant access by sending to authorized health care professionals. They
have used ABE for encryption by using the patient’s identity and a TAC that is
specific to a particular medical record as the two main attributes for encryption and
decryption. They have implemented emergency access by allowing the encryption
of certain records using the attribute “emergency" without any TAC, with logging
implemented to keep track of emergency access. The authors have not mentioned
how the system would handle revocation of users and have not implemented a
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secure means of transmission for the generated TACs which they have stated could
be transferred via traditional means such as a phone or on paper.
The authors in [19] proposed the design for a secure interoperable cloud based
service for private health records (PHR) which uses the Continuity of Care Doc-
ument (CCD) for the storage and exchange of information and employs several
security mechanisms using available open standards such as XACML, XML en-
cryption, XML signature and XML key management specification. They have
used CP-ABE to achieve patient controlled encryption, and the public key encryp-
tion with keyword search (PEKS) scheme to provide privacy-preserving keyword
search. They have used the Secure Channel Free PEKS scheme which allows users
to perform private searches over encrypted data for specific matching keywords
without revealing the keywords or any partial matches to the server.
Li et al. in [27] proposed a framework titled Scalable and Secure Sharing of
Personal Health Records in Cloud Computing Using Attribute Based Encryption
containing a suite of security mechanisms that aimed to solve the existing issues
in cloud-based PHR storage systems which include eliminating the risk of privacy
exposure, key management scalability, flexible access and effective revocation of
existing users. Their work focuses on the multiple data owner scenario similar to
our proposed architecture and thus they have divided the users in the system into
two broad security domains similar to [21], which reduces the complexity of key
management for data owners and users who require access, with the improvement
being that in their scheme the public domain (PUD) is managed by multiple AAs.
The personal domain is made up of users who are close to the data owners (i.e.
patients) such as family members and friends while the public domain is made
up of the various professionals who require access to the patient’s records such as
doctors and pharmacists. In order to apply ABE to the personal domain, Li et
al. have employed the Key Policy ABE with efficient revocation as proposed in
[40] with the data owner fully responsible for handling this particular domain. The
data owner generates keys for members of this domain with the access structure
corresponding to their level of access and sends this keys to the corresponding users
in order to grant them access. The authors have employed in the public domain
the use of the MA-ABE proposed in [12] and improved in [13]. Since the MA-ABE
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scheme they adopted is essentially a KP-ABE scheme with multiple AAs, in which
control of access lies with the AAs who generate the keys for the different attributes
therefore taking away control from the data owner, Li et al. have made a slight
modification to how this scheme is used in their system. In order to grant the data
owner more control, the system requires that the key access policies and the general
approach for specifying the ciphertext attributes be agreed upon in order to grant
the users some level of control in specifying the access policy of the ciphertext
from their end by choosing the right attributes. To improve security in the public
domain, Li et al. have slightly modified the Multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE)
scheme proposed by [13] to enable efficient user revocation by using the revocation
technique proposed by [40] which was not a feature of the original scheme. Their
system provides dynamic attribute and access policy modification together with
on-demand user/attribute revocation, together with break glass access, in order to




Framework for Electronic Health
Records (EHRs)
3.1 Overview
This chapter introduces the framework that is the basis of this thesis. We start
with a description of the ABE scheme that plays an essential role in providing the
features of security and privacy for the framework. The construction of the ABE
scheme follows after the definition of the various algorithms. The construction
shows the mathematical concepts that confirm the inner workings of the different
algorithms.
A description of the entire framework follows with the architecture and its
corresponding entities highlighted. We then provide use cases together with a
detailed description of the individual use cases and the roles the entities play.
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3.2 Proposed Multiple Authority Ciphertext Pol-
icy Attribute Based Encryption with Outsourced
Decryption
This section contains the formal definition of the underlying proposed ABE scheme
for the overall framework. This formal definition provides a description of the
algorithms that are part of the ABE scheme. The second part of the section
provides more detailed information in the form of the mathematical construction
for the ABE scheme.
3.2.1 ABE Scheme Algorithm and Security Definition
Our ABE scheme has been adapted from the scheme developed in [44]. Using
similar methods applied in [18], we have modified the scheme with the aim of
outsourcing the bulk of the decryption algorithm operation to the CSP. This section
contains a definition of the algorithms that make up our ABE scheme.
Algorithm Definitions
The following algorithms make up the ABE scheme. These algorithms include: the
setup and system initialization algorithms, the secret key generation algorithm,
the encryption, transformation and decryption algorithms as well as the revocation
algorithms. They are described a follows:
(1) CASetup - The Certificate Authority Setup algorithm is the algorithm exe-
cuted by the Certificate Authority (CA) in order to generate the Global Mas-
ter Key (GMK) and Global Public Parameters (GPP) of the entire scheme.
It takes as input the security parameter of the scheme. The CA makes the
GPP available to all entities in the system.
(i) UserReg - The User Registration algorithm is run by the CA whenever
new users are being added to the system. The CA assigns a unique id to
each new user and also generates two public-private key pairs together
with user certificates and their corresponding verification keys for each
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new user. The CA sends one each of the generated public and private
keys to the user together with the certificate.
(ii) AAReg - The Attribute Authority Registration algorithm is run by the
CA whenever new Attribute Authorities (AA) are joining the system.
The CA assigns a unique id to each new AA and also send the other
public and private keys for each registered user to the AA together with
the verification keys for the generated certificates.
(2) AASetup - The Attribute Authority Setup algorithm is run by the individual
Attribute Authorities (AAs) and generates the public-secret key pair for the
attribute authority. It also generates a public-version key pair for each of the
attributes under the control of the AA that is provided as input in the AA
universal attribute set.
(3) SKGen - The Secret Key Generation algorithm is run by the corresponding
AAs in order to provide the user with the secret key for the attributes that
they have been assigned. The AA takes as input the system GPP, the users
Global Public Keys (GPKs), one of the user GSKs, the set of attributes
and their corresponding public-version key pairs. It provides the user with a
secret key that can be used for decryption.
(4) Encrypt - The Encryption algorithm is run by the data owner in order to
encrypt the corresponding piece of data. This algorithm takes as input the
system GPP, the public keys (PKs) for the AAs involved in the encryption -
as they are in control of the attributes that make up the policy under which
data is to be encrypted - of the data, and an access policy. It provides as
output a ciphertext (CT) which implicitly contains the corresponding access
policy.
(5) CTransform - The Ciphertext Transformation algorithm is responsible for
the transformation of the CT into an El Gamal style ciphertext that can be
easily decrypted by the end user. This algorithm is executed by the Cloud
Service Provider (CSP) and takes as input the ciphertext, the secret keys of
the attributes in the user’s possession and the user’s GPK. It produces as
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output a partially decrypted ciphertext (CT’) if the user’s secret keys meet
the policy under which the data was encrypted, otherwise it outputs an error.
(6) Decrypt - The Decryption algorithm is run by the end user and takes as
input the partially decrypted ciphertext (CT’) and the user’s global secret
key which is not shared with any other entity in the system and produces the
original data as output for the user in its plain form.
(7) UKeyGen - The Update Key Generation algorithm is run by the AA under
whose control the revoked attribute falls. The algorithm takes as input the
SK of the AA, the revoked attribute and the current version key for the
revoked attribute. It produces as output an updated version key for the
revoked attribute. It also produces an update key to be used to update the
corresponding secret keys of users who possess the revoked attributes and
whose access is not being revoked. It also produces an update key for the
affected ciphertexts whose access policies contain the revoked attribute to
allow for users who still maintain access to be able to decrypt while denying
revoked users further access.
(8) SKUpdate - The Secret Key Update algorithm is run by each non revoked
user in the system and takes as input the corresponding secret key acquired
from the AA that control the affected attribute together with the update key
for user secret keys generated by the UKeyGen algorithm. It outputs a new
secret key for the user.
(9) CTUpdate - The Ciphertext Update algorithm is run the CSP and takes as
input the affected ciphertexts and the update key generated by the UKeyGen
algorithm for ciphertext update. it outputs a new ciphertext that can only
be decrypted by users with a current version of the corresponding revoked
attribute.
ABE Scheme Security Definition
The security definition of the ABE scheme is based on the correctness definition of
the scheme based on the following conditions:
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(1) Encryption and Decryption - Decrypt(CTransform(Encrypt(Message, GPP,
PKaids), SKuid,aid, GPKuid), GSK ′uid) = Message
(2) Revocation - For an attribute x̃aid′ , Decrypt(CTransform(CTUpdate(Encrypt(
Message, GPP, PKaids), UKc,x̃aid′ ,uid), SKuid,aid, GPKuid), GSK
′
uid) = Mes-
sage, only if version key for K̃x̃aid′ ,uid = version key for x̃aid′
This scheme is secure under the CPA model of security. Further analysis of the
security of the underlying ABE scheme together with the security game model and
proofs can be found in [44], the original scheme from which this was derived.
We also adopt the security assumptions of the original scheme [44]. The security
assumptions are as follows:
(1) We assume the CA is fully trusted in the sense that it will not collude with
any users in the system but it should not be able to decrypt any of the
ciphertexts in the system alone.
(2) Attribute Authorities are trusted but can be corrupted by an adversary.
(3) The Cloud Service Provider is semi-trusted. By semi-trusted this means that
the CSP may want to acquire additional knowledge of the data content, but
will always execute tasks/algorithms accurately [44].
(4) We assume that users are dishonest and may potentially collude with other
dishonest parties to gain unauthorized access to data.
3.2.2 ABE Scheme Construction
A. CA Setup - This procedure is run by the CA to setup the system
CASetup(1λ) −→ GMK,GPP (3.1)
where 1λ is the security parameter, GMK is the Global Master Key, and
GPP represents the Global Public Parameters.
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The CA chooses two multiplicative groups G,GT with the same prime order
p and a bilinear map e : G × G → GT and a hash function H : {0, 1} → G.
The CA chooses two random numbers a, b ∈ Zp
The GMK is set as (a, b) and the GPP is set to (g, ga, gb, H)
(i) User Registration - This is executed for all users in the system by the
CA. Each user is assigned a globally unique uid and for each uid, the
CA generates two random numbers uuid, u′uid ∈ Zp as its global secret
keys
GSKuid = uuid,




The global public keys for each user is generated as
GPKuid = g
uuid ,





The CA generates a Certificateuid for each user uid and send (GPKuid, GSK ′uid,
Cerificate(uid)) to the user.
(ii) Attribute Authority (AA) Registration - The CA assigns a globally
unique authority identity aid to each AA and sends (GPK ′uid, GSKuid)
for all registered users to AAaid. The CA also sends the verification key
vkCA to AAaid for verifying the Certificate(uid) assigned to each user.
B. AA Setup - Let Xaid be the set of all attributes managed by AAaid. The AA
generates three random numbers αaid, βaid, γaid ∈ Zp as its secret key.
SKaid = (αaid, βaid, γaid)
PKaid = (e(g, g)




For each attribute xaid ∈ Xaid, AAaid generates a public attribute key as
PKxaid = (PK1,xaid = H(xaid)
vxaid , PK2,xaid = H(xaid)
vxaidγaid) where vxaid is
the version key of attribute xaid i.e V Kxaid = vxaid .
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C. Secret Key Generation - The Attribute Authority with AAaid assigns a set
of attributes Suid,aid to user with uid after authentication and certificate ver-
ification. The AA chooses a random number tuid,aid ∈ Zp and computes a





K ′uid,aid = g
tuid,aid ,
∀xaid ∈ Suid,aid : Kxaid,uid = gtuid,aidβaidH(xaid)vxaidβaid(uuid+γaid))
(3.5)
If the user uid does not hold any attributes from AAaid, the user secret key
SKuid,aid only contains Kuid,aid.
D. Encryption - Data is divided into components based on the level of granu-
larity required for access control i.e m = {mi, · · · ,mn}. Data components
are encrypted using symmetric encryption keys κ = {κi, · · · , κn}. An access
structure (Mk, ρ) is defined for each content key κi(i = 1, · · · , n) and en-
crypted using the ABE scheme to produce the corresponding ciphertext. Let
M be an ` x n matrix, where ` denotes the total number of all the attributes
and the function ρ associates rows of M to attributes. The function ρ is not
required to be injective which allows for an attribute to be associated with
more than one row of M.
To encrypt the content key κi, the algorithm chooses a random element s ∈ Zp
which is used as the random encryption exponent. It then selects a random
vector ~v = (s, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ Zp where y2, . . . , yn are used to share the en-
cryption exponent s. It then computes ∀1 ≤ i ≤ ` : λi = ~v.Mi where Mi
is the vector corresponding to the i-th row of M. It then randomly selects
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r1, r2, . . . , r` and computes the ciphertext CTKi as






C ′ = gs,
C ′′ = gbs,
















Then the encrypted data is uploaded to the cloud server by the owner.
E. Ciphertext Transformation - This involves the transformation of the cipher-
text into an El Gamal style ciphertext referred to in this framework as a
token through partial decryption while the integrity of the original message
is preserved.
The transformation algorithm takes as input the ciphertext CT where CT =
(C,C ′, C ′′, C1, . . . , C`) which contains an access policy (M,ρ), the user’s global
public key GPKuid, and a set of secret keys from all the involved Attribute
Authorities {SKuid,aid}aidk∈IA i.e (K,K ′, Kxaid∀xaid ∈ Said) where Said is a set
of the user attributes. If the attributes provided do not meet the access policy
conditions, the algorithm outputs ⊥. The algorithm proceeds to transform
the ciphertext if the set of user attributes Said meet the conditions of the
access policy contained in the ciphertext.
Let I be defined as {Iaidk ∈ IA}, where Iaidk ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , `} can be defined as
Iaidk = {i : ρ(i) ∈ Saidk}. Let nA = |IA| be the number of AAs involved in
the access policy of the ciphertext. The algorithm chooses a set of constants
{ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that if the shares of a secret represented by {λi} are
valid with respect to the matrix component of the access structure, M , then
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the secret can be reconstructed as
∑
i∈I ωiλi. The algorithm computes the










































F. Decryption - The algorithm for decryption takes as input the partially de-
crypted ciphertext (CT ′) and the user’s secret key and produces as output
the original message. It performs an exponentiation on CT ′ in order to derive
















where PKaidk = e
(
g, g
)αaid . Therefore the original message which in this





G. User Revocation - User revocation which can also be referred to as attribute
revocation as used in some of the literature on the subject should achieve
two critical criteria. The revoked user should not be able to decrypt new
ciphertexts which have been encrypted using the public attribute keys of at-
tributes that the user was previously granted private keys for. This is referred
Chapter 3. Secure Privacy Preserving Framework for Electronic Health Records
(EHRs)
38
to as Backward Security. Any new user who has the right attributes should
be able to decrypt the original ciphertexts that were encrypted using those
public parameters. This is referred to a Forward Security. The revocation
algorithm used has been gotten from the scheme by Yang et. al in [44].
(i) Update Key Generation - In order to revoke an attribute x̃aid′ from a
particular user, the attribute authority (AA) responsible AAaid′ runs
the key update algorithm taking as input the secret key SKaid′ of the
attribute authority, the revoked attribute x̃aid′ , and its current version







6= vx̃aid′ ) for the revoked attribute x̃ai′d.
The AAaid′ then generates a unique update key UKs,x̃aid′ ,uid for secret
key update by each non-revoked user uid as




−vx̃aid′ )(uuid+γaid′ ) (3.10)











The AAaid′ sends the UKs,x̃aid′ ,uid to the non-revoked user uid and sends
UKc,x̃aid′ ,uid to the cloud server.
The AAaid′ then updates the public attribute key, PKx̃aid′ of the revoked
attribute x̃aid′ to ˜PK x̃aid′ as
˜PK x̃aid′ = (PK x̃aid′ )
UK1,x̃aid′ (3.12)
(ii) Secret Key Update - This process is run by the non revoked users in the
system. The algorithm produces an updated secret key ˜SKuid,aid′ using
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the update key UKs,x̃aid′ ,uid for the individual users as
K̃uid,aid′ = Kuid,aid′ ,
K̃ ′uid,aid′ = K
′
uid,aid′ ,
K̃x̃aid′ ,uid = Kx̃aid′ ,uid.UKs,x̃aid′ ,uid,
∀xaid′ ∈ Suid,aid′\{x̃aid′} : K̃x̃aid′ ,uid = Kx̃aid′ ,uid
(3.13)
(iii) Ciphertext Update - The ciphertext CT is updated using UKc,x̃aid′ ,uid
to C̃T as
C̃ = C,
C̃ ′ = C ′,
C̃ ′′ = C ′′,
∀1 ≤ i ≤ ` :C̃ ′i = C ′i,
D̃i = Di,













3.3 Secure Privacy Preserving EHR Framework
This section provides information about the privacy preserving EHR framework
that is the main subject of this thesis. We provide a system architectural model that
shows the different entities that are part of the framework and how they interact
with each other to achieve the functionalities of this framework. We also provide
specific use case scenarios together with a detailed description of the individual use
cases to provide further information of the different settings in which the framework
could be applied.
Our EHR framework is an improvement on the other existing ABE based health
care exchange systems in different ways. Our underlying multi-authority scheme is
a major improvement on the other single authority schemes in terms of robustness.
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Also the introduction of a Certificate Authority for user and authority identification
allows for a decentralized system in which attribute authorities cannot collude in
order to circumvent the system and gain access to data. Also our framework’s use
of an ABE scheme with outsourced decryption significantly improves its usability.
This allows end users to use devices with low computational power to access the
necessary data.
3.3.1 System Architecture/Model
The system architecture is made up of several entities that perform different func-
tions with regards to their roles in the system.
System Entities
(1) Users - Users are the members of the system that add or request data. They
could be either data owners or data users with individuals able to play both
roles in general with the system.
(i) Data Owner (DO) - The DO is responsible for the generation of data to
be stored on the platform and retains ownership of data for the duration
of its life cycle. The Data Owner also specifies what requirements are
to be met for any user to have access by indicating what attributes they
should possess though the policy used for data encryption.
(ii) Data User (DU) - The DU represents entities that require access to
stored data. They are required to possess the right attributes in order
to gain access to stored data on the cloud.
(2) Certificate Authority (CA) - The CA plays the central role of assisting with
the verification of the identity of the different entities to enable them to
securely communicate with one another. It does this by providing the corre-
sponding certificates and public parameters used in the verification process.
(3) Attribute Authority (AA) - The AA is responsible for providing the appropri-
ate public and private key parameters for the different attributes under their
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control to the appropriate owners and users for the encryption and decryption
of data.
(4) Cloud Service Provider (CSP) - This entity provides the necessary storage
facilities for data on the platform and also the processing capabilities for part

















































Figure 3.1: System architecture diagram showing interaction be-
tween the multiple framework entities with numbers indicating the
typical order of the interactions




Figure 3.1 shows the complete architecture of the entire system framework, indi-
cating the various entities and the different ways in which they interact with each
other as part of the overall system. The numbers indicate a typical flow of the
different interactions between the entities in the system.
• Step 1 - Data owner owner registers with the CA to get their public-secret
key pair, a certificate, and an ID. The public key would be used for the
transformation of the ciphertext later through the CSP and the secret key
will be used by the user to complete the decryption process on the user end.
• Step 2 - The CA sends the corresponding data to the user in response.
• Step 3 - The Attribute Authorities register with the CA and get an ID and
corresponding user information which includes another public-secret key pair
and a verification key for the user certificated generated by the CA.
• Step 4 - The CA sends the corresponding data to the AA in response.
• Step 5 - After setting up, the AA makes available to the data owners in the
system, its public keys and the public key for the attributes to be used for
encryption.
• Step 6 - The Data Owner encrypts the actual data using symmetric encryp-
tion and using ABE, encrypts the corresponding symmetric key. Both the
encrypted data and encrypted symmetric key are uploaded to the cloud.
• Step 7 - Potential Data users request for the secret key of the attributes that
they have been approved for.
• Step 8 - The AA send the corresponding secret keys generated for the users.
• Step 9 - Users request access to data from the CSP and provides the cor-
responding information which includes, their attribute secret keys and the
public key they received from the CA.
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• Step 10 - The CSP partially decrypts the symmetric key and send this to
the user together with the encrypted data. The user then completes the
decryption of the symmetric key using the secret key received from the CA
and then using the symmetric key, decrypts the data.
3.3.2 Use Cases
In a real world scenario, hospitals and other medical institutions would play either
the role of data owner or data user depending on where the data is collected and
where the data is to be used. Hospital A would be an owner for data generated at
its location for its patient and Hospital A would be a user when it requires access
to data generated at a different hospital which it needs for a range of reasons from
treatment to research.
The Attribute Authorities (AAs) in the real world would range from the admin-
istrations at different levels in the different hospitals that are part of the framework,
the Research Ethic Boards, the administrations at different levels in potential re-
search partners like academic institutions (i.e Universities), etc.
The CSP could be any of the real world cloud service providers such as the
AWS cloud, Google cloud to name a few while the CA could be provincial or
federal authorities responsible for oversight and regulations related to health care
and privacy.
The following figures and tables show different use case scenarios which capture
multiple use cases within the framework and the accompanying tables show a more
detailed of the use cases captures within the use case scenario diagrams.
Chapter 3. Secure Privacy Preserving Framework for Electronic Health Records
(EHRs)
44
Figure 3.2: Use-case diagram for EHR Exchange Framework (Ini-
tialization and Registration Scenario)
Use-Case Certificate Authority Setup
Actors Certificate Authority (CA)
Description This use-case occurs when the CA initializes the framework.
The CA generates the Global Master Key (GMK) and Global
Public Parameters (GPP) for the entire framework which
would be used for other processes within the framework.
Stimulus Certificate Authority runs CASetup algorithm to initialize sys-
tem
Response Initialize system and derive GPP and GMK.
Table 3.1: Certificate Authority Setup Use-Case Description.




Actors Certificate Authority, User (Data Owner & User)
Description This use-case occurs when a user requests to be added to the
system. The CA verifies their identity and then creates an
entry for the new user which includes their unique id and their
public parameters.
Stimulus CA runs UserReg algorithm to register a new user.
Response New user registered with their public information stored. The
user receives a public and secret key, a certificate and the GPP
for the framework.
Table 3.2: User Registration Use-Case Description.
Use-Case Attribute Authority Registration
Actors Certificate Authority (CA), Attribute Authority (AA)
Description This use-case occurs when an AA requests to be added to the
system. The CA verifies their identity and then creates an
entry for the new authority which includes their unique id.
Stimulus CA runs the AAReg algorithm.
Response New AA registered and the AA receives the public information
of all registered users in the system and the verification keys
for the generated user certificates. This triggers the Attribute
Authority Setup use-case.
Table 3.3: Attribute Authority Registration Use-Case Description.
Use-Case Attribute Authority Setup
Actors Attribute Authority (AA)
Description This use-case occurs when a new AA is being initialized. The
AA generates its public and secret keys together with the pub-
lic keys for every attribute under its control.
Stimulus Attribute Authority runs AASetup algorithm.
Response AA initialized with its public and private keys together with
the public keys for its attributes.
Table 3.4: Attribute Authority Setup Use-Case Description.
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Use-Case Secret Key Generation
Actors User (Data Owner & User), Attribute Authority (AA)
Description This use case occurs when a user requests a secret key from
an AA in the system. The AA verifies the user identity and
provides the user with the appropriate secret keys for that
authority and the attributes the user has been assigned.
Stimulus User secret key request.
Response If the user identity is verified using the available verification
key for their certificate, they are provided with unique secret
keys from the AA for the corresponding attributes.
Table 3.5: Secret Key Generation Use-Case Description.
Figure 3.3: Use-case diagram for EHR Exchange Framework (Data
Flow Scenario)




Actors User (Data Owner), Cloud Service Provider (CSP)
Description This use case occurs when a data owner (also a user) wants to
add data to the the framework. The encrypt the data using
a symmetric key and then encrypt the symmetric key using
the appropriate access policy as part of the underlying ABE
scheme. Encrypted data is stored on the cloud.
Stimulus User data storage.
Response Encrypted data is stored on the cloud.
Table 3.6: Data Encryption Use-Case Description.
Use-Case Ciphertext Transformation
Actors User (Data User), Cloud Service Provider (CSP)
Description This use case occurs when a user is requesting data from the
cloud. The user provides the appropriate information and if
they are valid, the CSP transforms the stored ciphertext into
an El-Gamal style ciphertext
Stimulus User data request from CSP
Response CTransform algorithm is run and if the provided information
is valid, a partially decrypted ciphertext is returned to the
user.
Table 3.7: Ciphertext Transformation Use-Case Description.
Use-Case Data Decryption
Actors User (Data User)
Description This use case occurs when the user decrypts the partially de-
crypted ciphertext in order to access the symmetric encryption
key which is then used to decrypt the symmetrically encrypted
data.
Stimulus User receives partially decrypted ciphertext.
Response If successful, user gains access to symmetric key which also
grants them access to the original data in plain form.
Table 3.8: Data Decryption Use-Case Description.
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Figure 3.4: Use-case diagram for EHR Exchange Framework (Re-
vocation Scenario)
Use-Case Update Key Generation
Actors Attribute Authority (AA), User (Data Owner & User)
Description This use case occurs when an existing user is being revoked
based on attributes they have secret keys for. The AA that has
control of the attribute generates an update key pair. One to
be used by users who share that attribute and still have valid
access. The other to be used by the data owner via the CSP
to update the affected ciphertexts.
Stimulus The user who owns the corresponding data puts in a request
with the appropriate AA who runs the UKGen algorithm.
Response If successful, provided update keys for the secret keys and
ciphertexts to the appropriate users.
Table 3.9: Update Key Generation Use-Case Description.
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Use-Case Secret Key Update
Actors User (Data Owner & User)
Description This use case occurs when still valid users need to update their
keys to retain access to ciphertext encrypted with attributes
for which an existing user has been revoked. The user uses the
update key it has received from the Attribute Authority.
Stimulus Existing user is revoked and a still valid user updates their
secret key for the corresponding attribute.
Response User’s secret keys matching the affected attribute is updated.
Table 3.10: Secret Key Update Use-Case Description.
Use-Case Ciphertext Update
Actors Cloud Service Provider (CSP), User (Data Owner)
Description This use case occurs when a data owner requests to update the
current ciphertexts that are part of the system after an existing
user has had their secret keys revoked. The corresponding
ciphertext is updated by the CSP using the provided update
key.
Stimulus User (Data Owner) puts in a ciphertext update request.
Response Ciphertext is updated to prevent further access by the revoked
user.




This chapter highlights the information about the software and hardware specifica-
tions involved in the implementation of the underlying framework. It also shows the
results of performance tests for the underlying ABE scheme in relation to scalabil-
ity of computational overhead with regards to the number of attribute authorities
and attributes involved in the system for data encryption, data decryption, and
user revocation.
4.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluated the performance of our system framework by implementing the un-
derlying ABE scheme in an environment using hardware and software tools as
described below. We have focused on the performance of the underlying ABE
scheme as there have been well established performance metrics for the multiple
available types of symmetric encryption that could be used for the encryption of
the actual data, with the ABE scheme used for the encryption of the symmetric
key.
4.1.1 Hardware and Software Tools
The following hardware and software tools were used in setting up and running our
experiments.
• Linux Server - We used a Linux Server running Ubuntu 18.04.3 LTS with
12GB RAM size and an Intel Core i5-6400 CPU @ 2.70GHz x 4 processor.
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• Python - We wrote our underlying code using Python 3.7 as this gave us
access to some other effective libraries that played a role in the robustness of
our code and evaluation during our experiments.
• Charm Crypto Library[1] - We used the charm-crypto library for the imple-
mentation of the ABE components of our framework. Charm is a library
implemented in python that has multiple contributors in the cryptographic
field and as a result gives access to a robust tool set that provides function-
alities related to pairing based public key encryption schemes such as ABE.
Our scheme was implemented using ’SS512’, a super-singular elliptic curve
with a 512-bit base field with groups of prime order.
4.1.2 Framework Development
Using the tools and schemes provided by the charm crypto library, we have devel-
oped our framework locally using python and set it up to run on the Linux server.
We have developed the different algorithms that are part of the framework into
different modules in order to evaluate the performance of those algorithms that
would typically reside on the user end in a real world deployment scenario of our
framework architecture. We have done this to enable us to measure the perfor-
mance of our system without incurring the additional cost of purchasing resources
using any of the available real world cloud service vendors.
We have setup a different module for our experimental demo in order to scale
the number of attribute authorities (AA) and attributes involved in the different
algorithms (i.e encryption, decryption, and revocation). We also deployed a policy
generation module to ensure that we have an access policy that includes the right
number of attributes from the right number of authorities using the appropriate
gate for our experiments. These modules allowed us to test the performance of our
scheme in an automated form and allowed for easy modification and troubleshoot-
ing along the way.
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4.2 Performance Evaluation
We evaluated the performance of our system by evaluating the computational times
for data encryption and decryption together with the time taken for users to update
their attribute based secret keys. We compare the performance of our framework
with that of the scheme by Yang and Jia [44] as mentioned in section 2.7. The
focus of our evaluation are the processes that are run at the user end as we are
working under the assumption that the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) provides in
theory unlimited processing power unlike what could be available on the several
devices at the user end.
We encrypt and decrypt sample symmetric keys using the underlying ABE
scheme. We also use access policies that exclusively have ‘AND’ gates to push the
limits of the maximum number of attributes that can be part of the access policy
or user keys with respect to the number of Attribute Authorities (AA) involved.
We have setup our experiments for each authority to have ten attributes each
as part of the access policy and user attributes for encryption and decryption.
This would mean that if ten authorities are involved in particular text, then the
result also indicated the performance of the scheme for a hundred attributes. Our
experiments have been run for 500 trials with the results being an average of the
individual runs. We settled on 500 trials after numerous trial numbers ranging
from 10 to 1000 and finding no significant impact on results in the number of trials
above five hundred (i.e 750 and 1000).
Our results for encryption as indicated in figure 4.1 show that our encryption
system is identical in performance with the encryption algorithm of the adapted
scheme for this framework [44]. Encryption requires mostly exponential operations
and the amount of time scales linearly with an increase in the number of AAs
and attributes that are contained in the access policy under which the file is being
encrypted. Our results for encryption show no negative impact on the performance
in comparison to the adapted scheme.
Our results for decryption show a constant decryption time irrespective of the
number of attribute authorities or attributes in comparison with the increase in
decryption time of the adapted scheme [44]. This can be seen in figure 4.2. These
results indicate that the amount of time for decryption involving a single attribute
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Figure 4.1: Encryption Computation Time
Figure 4.2: Decryption Computation Time
Chapter 4. Evaluation and Results 54
Figure 4.3: Revocation Computation Time
will be the same as that involving a hundred or more attributes, keeping the com-
putational overhead constant and allowing for the use of low computational de-
vices for the decryption process. This is because decryption in the framework only
requires a single exponentiation operation irrespective of the number of AAs or
attributes. The pairing operations which would have been part of the decryption
process as used in Yang and Jia scheme [44] have been outsourced to the Cloud
Service Provider (CSP).
Our setup for revocation was focused on showing how the time for revocation
in terms of an existing user updating their attribute based secret keys when an
existing user has been revoked scales with an increase in the number of attributes
being revoked. Our results show that the time scales linearly with an increase in
the number of attributes being revoked. This is as a result of the exponentiation
operations that are involved in the update process. The result of our experiment
can be seen in figure 4.3. Our results for revocation show no negative impact on
the performance in comparison to the adapted scheme. For revocation we show
how the time scales with just the attributes as those are the components of the
user secret key that are updated when an existing user has their access revoked.
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4.3 Security Analysis
In this section we analyze the different security and privacy properties of the frame-
work. We describe how the framework is able to achieve the conditions necessary
for confidentiality, integrity, and authentication including how it is able to preserve
privacy through its processes. We have shown the security definition of our un-
derlying ABE scheme in section 3.2.1, highlighting the correctness of the scheme
when it comes to the encryption, decryption, and revocation processes. We also
highlight the security model of the underlying scheme is based on the model of the
scheme we adapted and the detailed security proof can be found in [44].
Confidentiality and Integrity
Our framework meets the condition for confidentiality and integrity as described in
subsection 2.1.1. The framework is able to ensure confidentiality by ensuring that
users are only able to gain access to data that their access levels allow. Users are
only able to decrypt data for which they have the required attributes that match
the accompanying access structure. Also due to the randomness inserted in the
generation of user secret key for attributes, multiple users are unable to combine
their secret keys for individual attributes to gain access to data under a policy that
they are individually unable to access. The integrity of data is ensured as users
are only able to access data that they have been authorized for as there is a record
of the different users who have been granted secret keys for attributes that match
the policy.
The ability to revoke user access also enables the maintenance of the integrity
of the system. Also the certificates generated by the Certificate Authority ensures
that only valid users are able to request secret keys from the Attribute Authorities
in the system. Also no single AA is able to grant itself access to data within the
framework and the CA only plays the role of identity validation and does not have
access to a universal key that grants it access to the stored encrypted data. Also the
Cloud Service Provider (CSP) never has access to data in its plain form ensuring
that confidentiality and integrity are maintained.
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Authentication
Our framework has authentication built into its cryptographic processes. The fact
that users need access to certain attributes which they need to request from specific
authorities is in its own way a form of access control. This ensures that not only
do unauthorized users not gain any level of access to the system, the authorized
users are only able to gain access to data that they have been authorized for,
preventing them from being able to access data for which they do not have any
permissions. The access policy acts as the rules while the attributes could be seen
as the permissions that grant users access if they fit.
Privacy Preserving
The standard requirements for privacy as described in subsection 2.1.2 are met
by our framework. Privacy is preserved by the fact that data owners are able to
have some control over the level of access to data by specifying the appropriate
access policy when encrypting data before it is stored on the cloud. Also the
ability of the system to revoke access also ensures that user access can have a time
limit depending on the pre-set rules before they are granted access. Also the strong
underlying confidentiality, integrity and authentication mechanisms aid in ensuring
data privacy.
Users in the system are unable to combine their secret keys gotten from the
appropriate authorities in order to gain increased access to data within the system.
This is because of the randomness involved in the secret key generation by the
attribute authorities when generating the keys of individual users which makes
ABE collusion resistant as describes in section 2.5. Users are also not able to




Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Overview
This chapter provides a description of the contribution of this thesis and also
provides recommendation for future developments that could be implemented in
extending the functionalities of the framework.
5.2 Conclusion
The challenge of this thesis was to develop a system that would allow for the secure
exchange of EHRs among multiple parties through the use of potentially untrusted
third party services, such as cloud computing. The solution to this challenge would
need to be able to provide adequate security and privacy as a result of the sensitive
nature health data. It would also be important for the solution to be able to provide
effective access control at a granular level.
To create this solution, we have developed a framework for the sharing of elec-
tronic health data. We have placed the core of this framework an effective ABE
schemes, a Multi-Authority Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption with
Outsourcing (MACP-ABEwO) scheme. We have developed our scheme by using
existing techniques to modify an effective multi-authority scheme [44]. Our scheme
allows for the secure outsourcing of decryption to the Cloud Service Provider (CSP),
significantly reducing the computational resources of the end user devices required
for accessing data. This is achieved by offloading the more computationally in-
tensive operations of the decryption process to the CSP. This also allows for a
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significant reduction in the amount of time for decryption as the framework takes
advantage of the resources provided by the CSP in terms of computational power.
Our framework allows for the secure exchange of health data not simply among
medical institutions, but also with third party partners, such as researchers, who
contribute to developments in the area while preserving privacy. Our framework
uses symmetric encryption for the security of data and uses our proposed MACP-
ABEwO scheme for the encryption of secret keys users need to access data in its
original form.
We have developed our framework using existing tools in order to evaluate the
performance of our underlying scheme. We have built the different modules and
run them locally on a Linux server in order to save costs and evaluated the perfor-
mance of the algorithms that would typically run on the end user device. We have
evaluated the performance for encryption, decryption and revocation and shown
how they scale with an increase in the number of Attribute Authorities and at-
tributes. Our results show no negative impact on the encryption and revocation
time of the original scheme in comparison with out but shows a significant decrease
in the decryption time. This is because, as a result of outsourcing, the decryption
time remains constant irrespective of the number of attribute authorities or at-
tributes involved. We also evaluate the security of our scheme and show how it is
able to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and authentication, while also preserving
privacy.
5.3 Future Work
There are different areas of improvement in relation to our existing framework as
described below:
(1) Accountability - Our current framework is limited in its ability to ensure
strong levels of accountability as it can only be limited to the group of users
who have been granted secret keys for the corresponding attributes which
they share with others with the same level of access. A possible future de-
velopment would be to extend our underlying ABE scheme potentially using
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similar pairing based short signatures that are being developed with minimal
overhead on our framework.
(2) Searchable Encryption - Our current setup requires some sort of record in
the database to keep track of what type of data are being stored in their
encrypted form. Potential future developments would include the extension
of our underlying scheme to allow for searching at a more granular level over
the encrypted data.
In conclusion, our secure privacy preserving cloud based framework for shar-
ing electronic health data is a platform that allows for the sharing of electronic
health records. Taking into accounts the challenges that exist with the use of
third party storage services and the sensitive nature of the data being shared, our
framework provides potential solutions to the existing limits in the functionality of
current systems. Our framework is able to do this through the use of an effective
Multi-Authority Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption with Outsourcing
(MACP-ABEwO) scheme to provide adequate levels of security, preserve privacy
and allows for effective access control at a granular level.
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